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In a series of papers and a forthcoming book   (Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation) I have defended a version of a counterfactual theory of cause and causal explanation. Very, very roughly, C causes or figures in a causal explanation of E iff an intervention on C would change the value of E or else the probability distribution of E, given certain other conditions, the details of which may depend on the causal claim in question. In other words, the account I propose connects causal claims with counterfactual claims concerning what would happen  to an effect under interventions on its putative cause. An intervention is an idealized version of a human experimental manipulation, purged of its anthropocentric elements and characterized entirely in causal/correlational terms. 
The intuitive idea of   an intervention I on some magnitude X with respect to some other magnitude Y is that I is a causal process that changes the value of X in such a way that if any change that occurs in the value of Y, it occurs only as a result of the change in X and not in some other way. This way of putting matters sounds blatantly circular, since the formulation is in terms of a change in Y  occurring as a  “result ” of a change in X, but in fact (I argue) the charge of circularity can be avoided by means of a more careful formulation of the notion of an intervention. The key idea   is to proceed negatively, by formulating conditions that exclude all of the other  ways (in addition to Xs causing Y) that an intervention  I that changes X might be associated with changes in Y.  Thus  we require that the intervention I not be correlated with other causes of Y besides those causes that lie on the causal route (if any) from I to X to Y, that I not cause Y directly via a route that does not go through X and so on. If there is still a correlation between X and Y under interventions on X  meeting these conditions, the only remaining possibility is that X causes Y. The notion of an intervention is thus characterized causally  (the intervention must cause a change in X etc.) but this characterization does not involve reference to the existence or non-existence of a causal relationship between X and Y.  In this sense the appeal to interventionist counterfactuals is not reductionist (causation is not reduced to a non-causal notion of counterfactual dependence or to anything else) but also not viciously circular –   “X causes Y “ is elucidated in terms of information about other causal relationships (or their absence) and correlational information. Interventionist counterfactuals share a number of the features of Lewisian non-backtracking counterfactuals but (I claim) have clearer truth conditions and a more intuitive motivation.
	For the purposes of this paper, however, little will turn on the exact details of how we understand the notion of an intervention. The important (and, at least in the eyes of some of the other contributors to this workshop) controversial issue is instead the more general one  of whether, as I have contended, causal claims are to be understood as involving counterfactuals  at all. My aim in this paper is to defend this contention. 

1.	History
Let me begin with some history. The introduction to this workshop begins with a very brief historical sketch –   perhaps it would be more accurate to say an implied  sketch   - about the role played by counterfactuals in recent philosophy of science. Very briefly, the central historical claim is this: philosophers have  attempted to appeal  to counterfactuals to provide accounts of causation for decades, often in conjunction with appeals to the notion of law, which also has been regarded as centrally bound up with counterfactuals. More recently, some people (David Lewis, me) have offered accounts of causation and causal explanation that eschew appeals to laws, but  we’ve continued to accept the dogma that counterfactuals are central to understanding causation.  The time has come for philosophers to take the bold and progressive next step  of  relegating counterfactuals to the “ashbin of history” (as Trotsky would say), where they belong.
		I won’t comment on this as a reading of Lewis, except to observe that it fits oddly with a number of features of his account, among them   the important role assigned to laws in the similarity metric he uses to evaluate the truth of   the counterfactuals in terms of which he proposes to understand causation. That is,  Lewis’ account of causation does not really do away with an appeal to laws, although he assigns them a different role than orthodox nomothetic accounts.   I do, however, want to disagree with the rest of the implied history, even as a rough sketch.
		It is true enough that there are some prominent discussions of counterfactuals in the 1950s (Goodman ( ) is one obvious exemplar), and that from this period to the present, laws are often described as “supporting” counterfactuals.  I think, however, that we need to be clear about  the role assigned to counterfactuals in  these discussions.    Relatively few philosophers of science during this period wished to  use counterfactuals   to provide some independent purchase on notions like “law” and “cause”. Quite the contrary:  throughout the 1950s and 1960s counterfactuals were   regarded by most philosophers of science with great suspicion, as,  for that matter, was the notion  of “cause” and other modal concepts like “physical necessity”.   To the extent that counterfactuals were invoked, it was generally thought  that they needed to   be  explained in terms of  non- modal concepts that were regarded as less obscure and more acceptable to empiricists , like “regularity”. This was certainly Goodman’s view: when he talks about some generalizations (like all emeralds are green) “supporting” counterfactuals and others as failing to support counterfactuals, all that  he really means, roughly, is that we are willing to “project” certain regularities and not  others   or use certain regularities but not others  for prediction regarding unexamined instances.  The difference between the two sorts of regularities is a difference in how we behave in connection with them and that is all that   “support for counterfactuals” involves. The notion  of “support for counterfactuals” is  not   used to provide some independent, objective basis for the difference between lawful and accidental regularities.   Other prominent philosophers of science from this period, like Hempel,  share the broadly similar view  that counterfactuals should be explained in terms of facts about regularities.     
		In the early 1970s   David Lewis and   Robert Stalnaker, provided   novel  accounts of counterfactuals in  terms of similarity relations among possible worlds.    Lewis’ account was in my opinion a very impressive philosophical achievement,  but, it had, as Jim Bogen’s contribution to this workshop reminds us, several features that made it  unappealing to many philosophers of science. First, it was committed to a very strong form of realism about possible worlds other than the actual one- not something calculated to appeal to empiricist sensibilities. Secondly, it was hard to see what there was in scientific practice that corresponded to the similarity metric that Lewis proposed for the evaluation of the truth of counterfactuals, with its talk of miracles, trade-  offs  of match of particular matters of fact against violation of laws  and so on.   The similarity metric seemed  vague,  imprecise, and lacking any obvious connection with the epistemic goals of science.
In part because of this, while Lewis’ work on counterfactuals and his counterfactual theory of causation were very influential within mainstream analytical philosophy (especially, metaphysics), it had far less influence within philosophy of science.  The main approaches to understanding causation explored in the philosophy of science literature throughout the 1970s and 80s were, in addition to  law (really regularity)-based  approaches, probabilistic theories of causation of various sorts, whether reductionist (Suppes,   Salmon’s SR model) or non-reductionist (Cartwright,  Eells, Sober, perhaps Humphreys) and process theories (Salmon’s Causal Mechanical model, more recently physical process theories such as Dowe’s). None of these theories traded explicitly in counterfactuals, and in the case of Salmon- arguably the most influential philosopher of science working on causal explanation in the generation after Hempel -  the desire to avoid appealing to counterfactuals as far as possible was very explicit. 
  In fact,  insofar as there has been scientifically oriented work on causation besides the work of David Lewis and his students that makes explicit reference to counterfactuals, this work has, at least until very recently, been carried outside of philosophy of science in disciplines like statistics, epidemiology, econometrics and  artificial intelligence.  I include under this heading work on the “counterfactual” or “experimentalist”  approach to causal inference  inaugurated by Neyman and then developed by Donald Rubin, Paul Holland, and Jamie Robbins among others. I would also group under the heading of broadly counterfactual approaches, the work carried out by Judea Pearl on the use of directed graphs to represent causal relationships and perhaps also the work of Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (SGS), although I leave it to them to decide whether they want to describe what they have done in this way. Putting aside SGS,  it is only very recently that philosophers of science, such as my colleague Chris Hitchcock, have begun seriously using the resources of these counterfactualist approaches to elucidate various sorts of causal claims.
 		I mention all this because,   as I understand  recent   philosophy of science, the project of trying to understand causation without appealing to counterfactuals is not , as it is presented in this workshop, some bold new departure that has rarely been tried; on the contrary, there has been a very strong commitment among many philosophers of science to this strategy for decades. It has been tried repeatedly and, as I will suggest shortly, has repeatedly failed 
I will turn to  a more detailed defense of this last claim shortly, but first a few more remarks by way of background and stage-setting. Both the non-philosophical work on counterfactuals described above and the sort of approach to causal explanation that I favor depart from the more familiar  Lewis/Stalnaker treatment in several respects. First,  the kinds of counterfactuals that are relevant to understanding causation are connected to experiments – either actual or hypothetical. Rather than being understood in terms of similarity relations  among possible worlds, counterfactuals are understood as claims about what would happen if a certain sort of experiment were to be performed.  No one doubts that experimentation is a scientifically legitimate activity and tying counterfactuals to experimentation allows at least some counterfactual claims to be tested in a relatively straightforward way. Second, as already intimated, I agree with Bogen and other commentators about the vagueness and imprecision of  the Lewisian similarity metric. If counterfactual claims are to be used in a disciplined way, some apparatus must be deployed that spells out in a precise explicit way what is left underspecified in Lewis’ framework – how the “closeness” of one world to another is to be evaluated and so on. In the work to which I referred above, this is done by the use of systems of equations or functional relationships, or   by means of directed graphs, together with precise rules for transforming these to describe non-actual hypothetical situations of various sorts.  (The idea,  developed by both SGS and Pearl,   that an ideal intervention on a variable breaks all arrows directed into the variable while preserving all other arrows is one example of such a rule).  The equations and graphs, together with the rules specifying what happens under interventions,  tell us explicitly just what should be regarded as changed and what should be “held fixed” when we entertain various counterfactual assumptions.   If the equations and graphs are correct, they enable us to determine what would happen under these assumptions.   I would strongly encourage those who are skeptical about the use of counterfactuals to engage with the details of these  ideas rather than just focusing on the limitations of   Lewis’  framework.
My views about the use of  counterfactuals in connection with understanding causal claims and problems of causal inference are grounded in pragmatic considerations, not apriori metaphysics. For it to be legitimate to use counterfactuals for these purposes, I think that it is enough that (a) they be useful in solving problems, clarifying concepts, and facilitating inference, that (b) we be able to explain how the kinds of counterfactual claims we are using can be tested or how empirical evidence can be brought to bear on them, and (c) we have some system for representing counterfactual claims that allows us to reason with them and draw inferences in a way that is precise, truth-preserving  etc. I think that these conditions are met in many scientific contexts in which counterfactuals are used.  When they are met, I think we can safely  dismiss sweeping apriori arguments designed to show that counterfactuals are never scientifically legitimate, almost always lack truth values, or are always  false or vacuously true  and so on.
 As a specific illustration,  suppose that  you  set up a circuit with a fixed voltage source E, a variable resistance R and an ammeter that measures current I, all in series. Repeated measurements show that the circuit conforms to Ohm’s law,  E=IR, to a good degree of approximation. Now consider the following counterfactual claims:
(1)	If the resistance were set to R=r at  time t, and the voltage were set to E=e at t, then the current I would be i=e/r at t
(2)	If the resistance were set to R=r at time t, and the voltage were set to E=e at time t, then the current I would be i* ≠ ( is not equal to) e/r at t 
where t is some time in the past.
           Suppose that the resistance is not in fact set to r at t. According to Bogen, under determinism, all counterfactuals with false antecedents are true. Hence, both (1) and (2) are true, which, needless to say, makes counterfactuals pretty useless for helping to elucidate causation or anything else.  Bogen does not really argue for this conclusion, but instead simply stipulates   a semantics for counterfactuals   that   generates this result.  Why should we accept this semantics? Why not accept instead the more pragmatic point of view that I have recommended, according to which such counterfactuals can have non-trivial truth values, even under determinism, as long as we can describe how to test them, etc. If t were in the future, it would be a straightforward matter to do an experiment to test (1) and (2). Even if t is in the past, we may have very good evidence that the behavior of the circuit is stable over time, so that settting R=r and E=e at some future time t* provides very good evidence for what the value of e would have been had these operations   instead been carried out at t. Neither testing strategy seems to presuppose indeterminism, and under either strategy  one of (1) and (2) will turn out to be false.   
Suppose that t is in the past and we did the   experiment corresponding to the realization of the antecedent of (1) and (2) at t .  I take it that Bogen would agree that in this case there is a determinate matter of fact about whether the consequent of (1) or the consequent of (2) obtained.  However,  according to Bogen, if we didn’t do the experiment at t,   both (1) and (2) are vacuously true. (I guess this conclusion is supposed to hold  even if we do the experiment at t* and make the stability assumptions described above). Why believe this?  On the face of things, doing the experiment corresponding to the antecedent of (1) and (2)  doesn’t  make  (1) and (2) have  the truth values they do. Instead the  experiments look like ways of finding out  what the truth values of (1) and (2)  were all along.   On this view of the matter,  (1) and (2) have non-trivial truth values even if we don’t do the relevant experiments. 
Moreover, it is at least extremely natural to interpret Ohm’s law itself as making a claim about a pattern of counterfactual dependence holding among the variables E, R and I- that is, as making a claim about what the value of, say, I would be for various different values of E and R for circuits of various sorts. On the face of things, it is a straightforward empirical question, admitting of an objective answer, whether particular circuits conform to Ohm’s law when it is so interpreted. The functional claim made by the law, when it is given this counterfactual interpretation, looks  transparent and straightforward as  well – no Lewisian trade-off between matches of particular fact and violations of law or other obscurities make  an appearance. As this example illustrates, when we look at particular theories or experimental contexts,  I think that the problems about the testability and intelligibility of counterfactual claims that Bogen is worried about  frequently don’t arise. 
Ohm’s law is deterministic, as are most functional relationships in most areas of science- a  point to which I will return below. This means that the counterfactuals associated with it, like (1), make claims about what the exact value of some variable (in this case, R) would be under certain changes, rather than merely about what the probability distribution of that variable would be. Bogen seems to think that he can avoid considering   deterministic counterfactuals (if I may so call them) like (1) because the world is indeterministic and under indeterminism all deterministic counterfactuals are false (Or at least I think that’s what he is saying). I again recommend a more relaxed pragmatic attitude. In many, many cases deterministic theories describe how nature works up to a reasonable (sometimes very great) degree of approximation and that should be good enough for all of us. To the extent that we   accept such theories, we should also accept the deterministic counterfactuals that go along with them. In fact this point has nothing specifically to do with counterfactuals.   It seems to me that any argument that  because indeterminism is true,  all deterministic counterfactuals are false is also going to be an argument for rejecting all deterministic theories and not just their counterfactual implications. I would have thought that this is an unacceptable position (which of course will not prevent some  philosophers from endorsing it). 
  I also see no reason to follow Bogen in holding that  for a counterfactual like (1) to have a non-trivial truth value, there be some indeterministic process available could realize the antecedent of (1). Instead,   what  is required for (1)   and for Ohm’s law  interpreted counterfactually to be non-trivially true  is that  the relationship E=IR be stable or invariant in the right way: both stable over time as far as the behavior of the particular circuit of interest goes and also stable over some range of changes in the values of the variables figuring in Ohm’s law. That is,  what is required is that changing the resistance (at least over a certain range) in the fixed voltage circuit   not disrupt the relationship E=IR, but that instead the value of I changes in such a way that the Ohm’s law relationship continue to hold. This sort of invariance is certainly possible under determinism and in particular cases can be established either experimentally or on theoretical grounds. 
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, it seems to me that the whole contrast between laws and initial conditions involves stability or invariance claims of the sort just described. Laws are what remain stable or invariant as initial conditions are different and this gives us a basis for assessing counterfactual claims about what would happen if initial conditions were different from what they actually are.  Thus, unlike Bogen, who appears to hold (p.21) that, even assuming the correctness of Newtonian mechanics,   it makes no sense in a deterministic universe to ask what the orbit of Mars would be if the sun had, starting tomorrow, a different mass, I think that  this question makes perfectly good sense  and that Newtonian mechanics gives an answer to it, assuming, as I take to the  case, that there is no reason to suppose that if the mass of the sun were different, the laws of Newtonian mechanics would be different.  As a look at any physics textbook will confirm, it is standard scientific practice to assume that laws would continue to hold under various hypothetical initial conditions that are different from any actual conditions and to then ask what would follow from the laws under these hypothetical initial conditions – e.g. what would the trajectory of a particle of such and such mass at such and such position and initial velocity  be under  the gravitational field  produced by such and such  a source, where none of these conditions need be actual. Does Bogen really  want to endorse the extraordinary  claim that all this makes no sense under determinism?​[1]​
  
	2.  More Motivation for Going Counterfactual.
I said above that there have been repeated  attempts to  develop accounts of causation and causal explanation that dispense with  any appeal to counterfactuals and that these have been unsuccessful.  I lack the space to defend this claim in detail, but let me recall some examples from recent discussion that at least suggest this   conclusion. Part of my motivation, in   reminding readers of this background, is to dispel the idea that those of us who appeal to counterfactuals do so simply out of intellectual inertia. Instead, there are very specific problems- having to do,  for example, with elucidation of the notion of causal relevance – that are successfully handled by invoking counterfactuals and that I, at least, don’t see how to handle in any other way. I strongly  encourage those who want to avoid counterfactuals in understanding causation not to just ignore  this history   but to show us in detail how the alternative accounts they propose deal with the  problems I will be describing. 
I begin with some   standard counterexamples to the DN model. From the length l of the shadow cast by a flagpole and the laws of optics one may derive the height h of the pole but this derivation is no explanation of h and l does not cause h. From the fact Mr. Jones is male and has been taking birth control pills regularly and the generalization “All males who take birth control pills regularly fail to get pregnant” (a generalization  that at least describes a regularity and arguably satisfies many of the standard requirements for lawfulness),  one can derive that  (F) Jones fails to get pregnant but this derivation is no explanation of F and Jones’ taking birth control pills is not among the causes of F. 
An extremely natural diagnosis of both  examples is that they illustrate at least two points. (i) First, causes are factors that (in some sense that needs to be specified more precisely) make a difference or are relevant to their effects.   Explanations of effects should cite such difference makers.   (ii) Second, the instantiation of a DN structure in which C occurs in the  explanans  and E in the explanandum or, more generally, the instantiation of a lawful regularity linking C and E, is not sufficient to insure that C is a difference maker for E or is causally relevant to E . Thus although there is a law linking s to h in the flagpole example, s does not make a difference to h.   Similarly, although there is a law linking ingestion of birth control pills by males to failure to get pregnant, whether or not Jones ingests such pills does not   make  a difference for (is not causally relevant to) his failure to get pregnant. 
Assuming that something like this is right, the key question then becomes how these notions of “making a difference” or “relevance”  ” are to be understood. The account that I favor contends that these notions can be captured by interventionist counterfactuals: C makes a difference for E if some intervention on C will change the value or, in the indeterministic case, the probability distribution of E.   Why is the ingestion of birth control pills by   Mr. Jones  causally irrelevant to his failure to become pregnant? Because  there will be no change in whether he becomes pregnant under interventions that change whether he ingests birth control pills or more compactly because whether he becomes pregnant is not counterfactually dependent on whether he takes the pills. Why is the length of the pole’s shadow causally irrelevant to the height of the pole? Because the height of the pole is not counterfactually dependent (in the sense of this notion captured by interventionist counterfactuals) on the length of the shadow while the length is counterfactually dependent on the height. In both cases these counterfactual claims might be readily tested by experiments and indeed have a natural experimental interpretation. For example, one can do a controlled experiment in which Mr. Jones   (or better some group of males of which Jones is a member) is (are) given birth control pills while  other males are not and compare the difference in the incidence in pregnancy in the two groups. If the subjects in the control group are relevantly like Jones, the two groups give us evidence regarding   the truth value of   counterfactuals  like   “If Jones had not taken birth control pills, he would not have become pregnant”. 
If one does not attempt to capture the notion of difference- making in terms of counterfactuals, how else might one do it? One possibility, systematically explored in Wesley Salmon’s statistical relevance (SR) model of explanation, is to attempt to cash out this notion in terms of  conditional independence relationships.   Another possibility, explored in Salmon’s subsequent causal mechanical model, is to appeal instead to notions having to do with spatio-temporal continuity.  I want to briefly explore both of these attempts and to suggest that they are unsuccessful. In other words, one reason for cashing out the notion of difference making in terms of counterfactuals is that other attempts to do it don’t work. I will also add that from my point of view, one of the most important insights of Salmon’s  extensive work work on explanation is that it recognized that    notions like difference making and relevance are central to the ideas of cause and explanation,   and that some  elucidation of them  was necessary if we were ever to construct an adequate treatment of causal explanation. I stress this  point not just in order to acknowledge Wes’ insight, but because I  worry that  it has been lost sight of in some more recent treatments of causation.
As I said above, the basic strategy of Salmon’s SR model is to attempt to characterize “making a difference”, “relevance” etc in terms of  conditional independence relationships.  Thus, in the birth control pills example, Salmon’s suggestion is that the fact that whether Ms.  Jones (gender = W) ingests birth control pills (B) is causally relevant to whether she becomes  pregnant (P)  but not to the pregnancy of Mr.  Jones (gender = -W) is captured  by statistical relevance relationships like the following: P(P/B.W)  ≠ P ( -P/-B.W) but P(P/B.-W) = P( P/-B.-W).
 There is a great deal that might be said about this strategy but the main point I want to   make is this:    A substantial body of recent work has made it  clear that there are many situations in which conditional independence or statistical relevance relationships  greatly underdetermine  what the   casual relationships are. As a result, one cannot capture notions like “causal relevance”, “difference –making” etc. just in terms of such relationships. For example, making the standard assumption about the relationship between causal relationships and statistical independence relationships -  the Causal Markov Condition – both of the following distinct causal structures will imply exactly the same screening off relationships among A, B and C. (i) A  B--> C,  (ii) AB--> C where an arrow directed from A to B means simply that A causes B. In both cases, A and C will unconditionally dependent and independent conditional on B.​[2]​
 There are two other points about this example that are worth underscoring. Jim Bogen claims in his workshop paper that whether “one thing, causes, or makes a causal contribution to the production of another” depends   “just on what actually is, or has been, or turns out later on to be the case”, but not “upon what  would have been, or would be or would turn out to be  the case had things been otherwise than they actually were.” Let us call the actual occurrences etc. in terms of which, according to Bogen, causation is to be explained the actualist basis . Bogen does not further explain what sorts of things  he counts  as in the actualist basis, but historically one important way of drawing the contrast between the actual and what would have happened in the context of causation is to take the actual to have to do with the obtaining of correlations, regularities, or statistical patterns   among occurring events. (One of the main motivations for the SR model was to explain causation in terms of the actual in just this sense.) If this is what Bogen intends – if his claim is that causal relationships can be reduced to or supervene on or depend just on such correlations etc.- then  his claim is false, for the reasons just given. If instead Bogen means something else or more by “what actually happens” he needs to tell us more explicitly what this involves. I will return to this point below.  
The second point is that  the interventionist account that I advocate does provide a natural interpretation of what the difference in the causal structures and consists in and, moreover, one that explains why or in what sense causal relationships outrun statistical independence relationships. In particular, according to the interventionist account,  (i) and (ii) differ in what they say would happen under various hypothetical interventions. Structure (ii) says that some intervention on B will change the values of both A and C while no intervention on A will change the value of C (since there is no arrow between them) and similarly no intervention on C will change the value of A.  Also no intervention on A or on C will change B.  By contrast, according to (i), some intervention on A will change B and barring some very special functional dependencies between A and B and B and C (on which see below), some intervention on A will also change C, but no intervention on B will change A. The difference between (i) and (ii)  could only be cashed out in terms of (or would only reveal itself in   facts about patterns of statistical dependency) if all these possible interventions were actually to occur. If  this doesn’t happen, (i) and (ii)   will have an additional content that outruns what “actually happens”, at least insofar as this notion is understood as having to do with patterns of statistical dependence. This additional content has to do with what would happen if various interventions (that may in fact never occur) were to occur. 
 In  his 1984 Causal Mechanical (CM) model, Salmon  acknowledged the limitations of the SR model and  pursued a rather different approach to causal explanation.  There he introduced the notion of a causal process (defined in terms of the ability to transmit a mark in a spatio-temporally continuous way) and contrasted these with pseudo- processes which lack this ability. He also introduced the notion of a causal interaction between  causal processes. He claimed that explaining an explanandum- phenomenon E is a matter of tracing the causal processes and interactions leading up to E.    For example, suppose that a cue ball, set in motion by the impact of a cue stick, strikes a stationary eight ball with the result that the eight ball is put in motion and the cue ball changes direction.  The impact of the stick also transmits some blue chalk to the cue ball which is then transferred to the eight ball on impact.  The cue stick, the cue ball, and the eight ball are causal processes, and the collision of the cue stick with the cue ball and the collision of the cue and eight balls are causal interactions.   Salmon's  idea is that citing such facts about processes and interactions explains the motion of the balls after the collision; by contrast, if one of these balls casts a shadow that moves across the other, this will be causally and explanatorily irrelevant to its subsequent motion since the shadow is  not a causal process but rather   a pseudo-process.    Salmon  thus attempted  to cash out  the difference made by the cue stick etc.  for the subsequent motion of the ball in terms of facts about   spatio-temporally continuous patterns of mark transmission,  perhaps supplemented by facts about  statistical relevance relationships .  Salmon recognized that  the notions of  causal  process  and causal interactions   were  not entirely free of counterfactual commitments, but he thought  they relied   on   counterfactuals only minimally and hence could serve as a basis for a (largely) non-counterfactual theory of causal explanation.    Again, the   project is the same general one that Bogen and Machamer want to pursue – making sense of causation just in terms of “what actually happens” without appealing to counterfactuals-  but facts about spatio-temporal continuity  and not just facts about correlations now figure centrally in the actualist basis.
Does  Salmon’s newer strategy work? As my colleague Christopher Hitchcock shows in an illuminating paper (Hitchcock 1995),  the information about  Salmon-style causal processes and interactions just described  leaves something out that is quite important. What one usually thinks of as an elementary textbook "scientific explanation" of the motion of the balls following a collision  procceeds  by deriving that motion  from information about their masses and velocity before the  collision,  some   assumption  about the characteristics of the collision ( e.g. that it is perfectly  elastic) and the  law of the conservation of linear momentum. We usually think of the information conveyed by this derivation as showing that  it is the mass and velocity of the balls, rather than, say, their color or the presence of the blue chalk mark,  that is explanatorily relevant  to their subsequent motion    However,  it is hard to see what there is in the CM model that  allows us to pick out the linear momentum of the balls, as opposed to various other features of them,  as causally  relevant .  Both the linear momentum and the blue chalk mark communicated to the cue ball by the cue stick are marks that are transmitted by  the spatio-temporally continous causal process  consisting of the motion of the cue ball, and they are then transmitted via an interaction to the eight ball.  Again, in order to pick out the linear momentum as  causally relevant, it is very natural to appeal to counterfactuals – if the momentum of the cue stick, the cue ball etc. had been different in various ways, the subsequent motion of the balls would have been different  and this is why those momenta are causally relevant to their subsequent motion. Indeed, a natural account (which I have defended elsewhere) of why   the standard textbook analysis is explanatory   is that it shows   how the subsequent motion of the balls would have been different if the cue stick had imparted different possible momenta to the cue ball. By contrast, it looks as though the presence of the blue chalk mark is causally irrelevant to the subsequent motion of the balls precisely because if that mark were absent and the momentum of the cue stick the same as before the subsequent motion of the ball would have been the same.  The  counterfactuals just described seem to do a better job of capturing the notion of causal relevance or difference making than mark transmission or spatio-temporal continuity. 
These counterfactuals also   have a natural experimentalist interpretation; for example, one may show that the   subsequent motion of the balls is not (in the relevant sense) counterfactually dependent on whether they have chalk marks by  comparing what happens in various experimental set ups in which  the cue ball is marked with those in which it is not, the set ups being in other respects being relevantly similar (for example, with respect to the momentum of the cue ball). A similar experimental   methodology will show that the subsequent motion of the balls is counterfactually dependent on the momentum of the cue ball. 
Consider now another example,  due to McDermott, 1995 (p.  531). A dog bites off my right forefinger.  The next day I detonate a bomb by using my left forefinger.  If I had not lost my right finger, I would have used it instead to detonate the bomb.  The bite causes me to use my left finger which causes the bomb to explode but  (most of us judge) the bite does not cause the bomb to explode.  Why is this? There is a spatio-temporally continuous causal process running from the dog’s action to the loss of my right finger and a similar process running from  the movement of my left finger to the detonation of the bomb. Assuming that the loss of my right finger causes me to decide to use my left finger instead, there is presumably some very complicated causal process going on in my brain and nervous system linking these two events as well. According to any natural notion of causal mechanism, there appears to be   causal mechanisms connecting each of these events. Yet it apparently does not follow that the dogbite causes the explosion   from these facts. What is going on? 
	 Again, an interventionist/ counterfactual account provides a natural treatment.    In the structure under discussion, an intervention that changes whether or not a bite occurs changes whether I use my left or right finger to detonate the bomb.  Moreover, an intervention that changes the situation from one in which I use my left finger to detonate the bomb to a situation in which I do not detonate the bomb at all (with either finger) changes whether the bomb explodes.  However, an intervention that changes whether I use my left or right finger to detonate the bomb does not change whether the bomb explodes.  In other words, although there are changes in the value of L (whether I use my right or left finger) which are counterfactually sensitive to whether or not an intervention occurs that changes the value of B  (whether the dog bite occurs) , and other changes in the value of L (whether I use my left finger rather than not pressing the detonating button at all) to which the value of E is sensitive, there is no set of changes in the value of L which fulfills both these roles.  The changes in the value of L on which the value of E depends are completely different from the changes in the value of L which are influenced by the value of B,  so that   the functions linking B to L and L to E compose in such a way there is no overall counterfactual sensitivity of the value of E to the value of B along the  route connecting B to E ; something that is shown by the fact that  manipulating the value of B  does not change the value of E .	 
Finally, consider  causation by omission and the phenomenon of “double prevention” or “causation by disconnection”. In a paper on mechanisms presented at PSA 2000, forthcoming in PSA 2000 volume 2, I briefly  discussed  the lac operon model for  E. coli due  to Jacob and Monod. I  won’t repeat the details, but the basic idea is that  the presence of lactose in the bacteria’s environment leads to the presence of an agent, allolactose, that interferes with operation of a repressor that in the absence of lactose prevents   the synthesis of enzymes that metabolize lactose.  In other words, synthesis is initiated by interfering with something that would otherwise prevent synthesis and in this way whether or not  lactose is present “controls”  (I would say, “causes”) whether the enzymes are synthesized. In my PSA 2000 paper I raised the question of how   this control or causal relationship might be captured without the use of counterfactuals. I’ve received no answer to my query in the intervening two years and hence repeat my question here.  
More generally, I encourage those who want to dispense with counterfactuals   to show us in detail how  the causal relationships present in the other  examples described above may be captured or elucidated without appeal to counterfactuals.  I also encourage them to  situate their position with respect to the broader issues and problems described in this section. For example, do the anti-counterfactualists agree or disagree with the idea that causes  are difference makers?  If they agree, how exactly do they propose to capture the notion of difference-making without reference to counterfactuals?  If causal claims just have to do with what actually happens, what exactly goes in to this actualist basis? Statistical dependence relationships? Information about spatio-temporal relationships? Something more?  If the “something more” is described in terms of activities like “attracts”,  “repels” and so on,  how do the anti-counterfactualists respond to objection that these activity- descriptions carry counterfactual commitments?  It seems to me that in principle arguments against the use of counterfactuals should not carry much weight until this is done. 
3.	Rubin et al. on Experimental Design and Immaculate Interventions. 
 I remarked above on the existence of a tradition associated in statistics and epidemiology that explicitly analyses problems of causal inference in terms of counterfactuals.  In this section I want to very briefly describe some of the main ideas of this approach and then relate them to some of the criticisms Bogen levels at the notion of an intervention. This will also provide some additional motivation for the approach that I favor.
Suppose that   a new drug has been invented and it is claimed to cure (cause recovery from) the common cold . How might you test this claim? One possibility would be to give the pill to one or more people with colds and see if their colds go away.  This experimental design has an obvious defect: the experimental subjects might have recovered on their own, even without the drug, and if so, their recovery will be no evidence that the drug cures colds.  This is closely connected to the common sense judgment that  the experiment  is defective because it lacks an   appropriate control. Even this very simple example brings out the point that   what we are really interested in, when we inquire about the causal effects of the drug, is, to reiterate a point made earlier,   a difference or contrast –   the difference between the incidence of recovery  among the drug takers (the treatment group) and  its incidence among  some appropriately defined alternative   group  who do not take the drug, the latter being what we are trying to get at when we create a control   group. The original experiment is defective because it provides no evidence about whether such a difference or contrast exists. 
As  I have already  noted, there is a well-known tradition in statistics   and experimental design, associated with figures like Rubin and Holland, which  suggests that we should think  of this difference between treatment and control  in terms of counterfactuals:  the idea is that what we  are really interested in  is the difference between  what the  response (with respect to recovery) would be if a subject or group of subjects   were treated with the drug and  how this response compares with what the response would be if the very same subject or  subjects were not treated, other conditions remaining the same.  Adopting some of the notation standardly employed in this tradition, let us think in terms of a population of units, indexed by a subscript i. (Included in the description of the unit will be everything that is relevant to its response to treatment at a given time.) For simplicity let us suppose that there are just two possible treatments, a (for active) and c (control) which may be applied to these units. What we are interested in is the response of the units, assessed in terms  of  some variable Y, assumed for convenience to be real valued, to the treatments. We write Y(a,i) for what the response of unit i would be to treatment a and Y(c,i) for what the response of  i would be to c. Y(a,i) and  Y(c,i) are thus defined in terms of counterfactuals. The causal effect  for the unit i  of the difference in treatment between a and c is   defined to be C(i)= Y(a,i)- Y(c,i).  Note that implict in this notation is the idea that the response of unit i depends only on the state of that unit and the treatment it receives, and not on the state of other units.
This formulation brings out what Holland (1986) calls the   “fundamental problem of causal inference”. At least one of Y(a,i) and Y(c,i) must be unobservable in the sense that we cannot both give treatment a and treatment c to the same unit i at the same time. Thus we cannot determine the value of  C(i) unless  some additional assumptions hold. One such assumption is the assumption of temporal stability, which is essentially the assumption of constancy of response over time, regardless of treatment history (Recall the circuit example).  Suppose that i receives c at   time t0 and the value of Y (that is, Y (c,i)) is observed at t0. We  then give treatment a to i   at some later time t and note  the response Y(a,i).   If   there is reason to believe that the  value of Y(c,i) observed at t0  is the same as the value  of Y(c,i)    at t, then we have information about both Y(a,i) and Y(c,i) at t  and can calculate C(i).  Suppose that   I initially observe at t0   that  a  wall  switch is in the down position and an overhead light is off.   If I then flip the switch up at t and note that the light goes on and I also have reason to believe that my initial observation at t0  tells me what the state of the light would have been at t if I had left the  switch down, then I’m in a position to determine the causal effect of the flipping on the light. In effect, the earlier state of the system acts as a control for the treatment imposed at t. Temporal stability is sometimes a reasonable assumption to make – indeed,  in laboratory experiments in physics and chemistry, it can seem so natural and plausible that it is easy to overlook that one is making it (recall the experiment with the variable resistance discussed earlier)  - but it is an assumption and of course may well be false. 
Another assumption that will allow us to identify C(i) is what Holland calls unit homogeneity.  Suppose that Y(a,i )= Y(a, j)   and Y(c,i ) = Y(c,j) for two different units i and j. Then of course C(i) = Y(a,i )- Y(c,j)  both of which may be observed. Here the unit j acts as a control for i; its response to c is taken to tells us what the response of i would have been if it   had been exposed  to c instead of to a. 
If both temporal stability and unit homogeneity are false, there are other possibilities for causal inference – for example, we may define a notion of average causal effect C = E(Ya)- E(Yc) where E(Ya) and E(Yc) are the   average responses over the whole population if every unit were exposed to a or to c respectively.  Again both quantities are  defined in terms of counterfactuals. Nonetheless both quantities may be identified in randomized experiments in which the treatment allocation is independent of the unit- i.e, in which Z _|_ I, where Z is the treatment allocation and I represents the properties of the unit.
These simple examples suggest several more general points: First they illustrate how one can gather evidence that is relevant to counterfactual claims provided one is willing to make (and has justification for making) certain additional assumptions. Indeed, seen from this perspective, one of the virtues of the Rubin et al. account of causal claims in terms of counterfactuals is that it forces us to be explicit about what sorts of assumptions are needed to support causal claims and thus raises the question of what the justification for those assumptions is. On this view of the matter, one of the roles of this counterfactual characterization is   normative: it  spells out   what it is that we are trying to infer ( a difference between two quantities characterized counterfactually) , on the basis of certain observations  and other assumptions, and  this puts us in a position to ask whether those observations and assumptions really justify the inference.
I can spell this point out in a bit more detail by considering a  possible response to the counterfactual  framework – I suspect it will be Bogen’s and Machamer’s.  This is that  the framework  is unnecessary and baroque: we don’t need to appeal to counterfactuals at all to understand the logic of the experiments described above. Instead it is enough to attend to “what actually happens”. If say, we do an experiment in which treatment a is given to i and   j is used  as  a control (given c) then all that is really necessary is to observe what actually happens to Y for i and for j. One (of many) problem(s) with this response is that it gives us no insight into the properties that we would like the control to have – why one experiment that produces actual happenings is the right one to do and another is not.  Suppose,  first (Example 1), we give the drug to subjects who are healthy and have intact immune systems, while the controls from whom we withhold the drug have seriously compromised immune systems. In this case, a difference in the incidence of recovery between the two groups would not be evidence that the drug is causally efficacious. Similarly, suppose (Example 2) that while the drug itself is inefficacious, there is a placebo effect;  subjects who are given any  drug that they expect to have cold curing properties are more likely to  recover  than subjects who are given no such drugs. If this is the case and the experimental  design is such that the drug is administered to the treatment group and no drug is administered to the  control group, then again there will be a greater incidence of recovery in the treatment group even though the drug is not efficacious. 
The counterfactual account captures (or allows us to express) what is wrong with both experiments 1 and 2. In both cases what happens in the control groups that are constructed does not tell us about Yc   – that is, what would happen in the counterfactual situation in which the drug is withheld from those in the treatment group who (in the actual situation) receive the drug. In other words, one of the motivations for the counterfactual formulation is that it helps to tell  us what we should be aiming at in  choosing one experimental design or control group rather than another. What we try to do is to create a control group that is relevantly like or at least conveys reliable information about Yc . This involves, for example, creating a control that is relevantly like the treatment group with respect to health and immune function – e.g., by explicit matching or by randomization. Similarly, one obvious device for dealing with the possibility of a placebo effect is to give the controls some drug which (unknown to them) is inactive in an effort to insure that both groups are similar  along the receives –some- drug -that -is thought- by -the subject -to -be -curative  dimension. If properly constructed such a control will give us information about what would happen in the hypothetical or counterfactual experiment in which the very same subjects who in fact are given the drug of interest are given the placebo instead.
The ideas about experimental design  which I have been describing do not explicitly appeal to the notion of an intervention. But one way to think about this notion is that spells out more specifically just what the counterfactual situations –Ya and Yc -that we want to  compare should look like. For example, one feature of an intervention I  on X with respect to Y is that I should not correlated with other causes of Y besides those that lie on the causal route from I to X to Y. In an experiment like experiment 1 in which  the drug is given preferentially to healthy subjects, I is correlated with  such a confounding cause of recovery and the experimental manipulation does not qualify as an intervention. Hence it does not provide  the sort of information (about what would happen to the subjects’ recovery or probability of recovery  under interventions that administer the drug) that, according to the interventionist/counterfactual account I favor, is relevant to the assessment of the causal efficacy of the drug. Similarly for experiment 2.
 Bogen scoffs at the interventionist idea that what we are trying to figure out when we assess the causal effect of X on Y is how Y would change under a certain sort of special change that involves a change only in X and in factors  between I and X and Y- he calls this the “immaculate conception of interventions”. In fact, however, it seems to me that this is exactly what we are trying to figure out in the drug case and this fact explains why we design the experiment as we do. For example, we try to insure that immune system status is the same across the two groups because we want  to exclude the possibility that the difference in recovery between the treatment and control groups is due to a difference in immune system status rather than the drug. Similarly, the control group is given a placebo to allow us to assess whether the observed incidence of recovery is due specifically to the drug. 
It would be interesting to hear how those who think that counterfactuals have no role to play in understanding causation would deal with the issues about choice of control groups just described.  If causation just has to do with what actually happens, why don’t I just  do experiment 1 or experiment 2   and record  what actually happens in the treatment and control groups? What explains why these particular actual happenings are not the appropriate ones to consider if we want to know whether the drug causes recovery while other possible experiments are not? Accounts of causation that appeal to  interventionist counterfactuals attempt to provide an answer to this question.
Part of Bogen’s objection to the notion of an intervention and to interventionist counterfactuals is that he thinks that  the relevant interventions can rarely if ever  be performed. That is,  he claims that in all or almost all cases all the manipulations that can actually be carried out will be “fathanded” and non-immaculate-- changing  more than just X and what is on the route from I to X  to Y.  I think that this is a considerable overstatement. In the light switch example, if I repeatedly make voluntary decisions about whether to flip the switch and find that whether I move the switch   up or down is perfectly correlated with whether the light is on, it typically will be true that my manipulations do not affect whether the light is on through any other route except the route going through the position of the switch. Moreover, I will typically have good reason to  believe that this is true. In other words, my manipulations will be (and will be justifiably believed by me to be) “immaculate”. Of course,  this won’t be true in imaginable special circumstances – e.g., if a clever engineer has arranged things so that the switch does not influence whether  the light  is on but a motion detector responds to the movement of my hand and turns the light on or off by an independent circuit. But needless to say, these are not typical circumstances and if it is suspected that they obtain, there are additional tests that might be done to assess this sort of possibility.
 More generally, it seems to me that often people really are in a position to determine that their  voluntary actions in changing X  are unlikely to be correlated with other causes of Y that lie off the route from I to X to Y.  Again,  if there there are specific grounds for doubt,  there are ways of addressing  these -  thus, in the drug example,  randomization,  single or double blind designs, and placebos might  be used to exclude the possibility of various specific off –route causal influences on Y.
   While I thus think that Bogen is wrong to think that successful interventions can rarely be carried out, I fully agree with him that there are many cases in which we make and come to believe causal claims, even though the interventions that, according to me, are involved in elucidating those claims cannot be carried out – whether because of technological limitations, moral prohibitions, or other sorts of reasons. This is true both for cases in which we reach causal conclusions on the basis of non-experimental (or purely “observational”) evidence and  for cases in which we make causal inferences on the basis of experiments but the only experimental manipulations that we can carry out are non-immaculate. Indeed, this  general observation   about the unavailability of non-immaculate interventions in the case of many causal claims    is one that I myself have made at some length in other papers. 
The question is: what follows from this observation? Bogen seems to think that it follows that  the account I propose is fundamentally misguided – perhaps because it is “unrealistic” in some way. Unsurprisingly, I don’t agree. Even when we cannot carry out immaculate interventions, the interventionist account remains correct and indeed provides considerable illumination. In part, it does so by, to repeat a point introduced earlier, elucidating what it is that we are aiming at or trying to discover when we engage in causal inference when immaculate intervention is impossible. In particular, on the interventionist account what we are trying to do in such cases is to discover, on the basis of evidence that does not result from interventions,  what would happen were an intervention to be performed.  Ironically, the extended example from Lashley that Bogen invokes by way of criticism of the interventionist account seems to me to  nicely illustrate this very point about the role of the account as a normative ideal.
		According to Bogen’s presentation, which I will follow, Lashley was interested in testing the causal claim that visual cortex (by which he means the striate or occipital cortices )plays a role in visual processing only and is not capable of playing a role in any other activities, even in animals previously deprived of visual input . Lashley reasoned that if this claim was    correct, then if rats were successfully trained to run a maze after  their  eyes had been destroyed, their visual cortex would make no contribution to their    subsequent maze performance. As Bogen himself remarks, in a passage to which I will return:
		The ideal way to test this [claim] on rats would be to blind them, train them to run the maze, and then lesion their visual cortices  … without damaging any other parts of the brain.(Lashley [1960] p.435)  If performance is impaired then     the visual cortex must be capable of at least two functions
In fact, the technology available to Lashley did not allow him to perform such an “ideal” experimental intervention. He could not destroy substantial amounts of visual cortex to impair maze performance without destroying other adjacent areas that were not part of visual cortex. As Bogen explains, Lashley attempted to work around this difficulty by “lesion [ing] the visual cortex in a variety of different ways, each one of which was designed to do collatoral damage to a somewhat different adjacent structure”. Thus in one group of rats, the hippocampus was lesioned in addition to visual cortex but auditory cortex was spared, in another group the reverse procedure was carried out and so on for  different groups. The performance of all groups was worse after lesioning. 
		Why did Lashley proceed in this way? I would have thought that the obvious answer is  that he was concerned that, in the experimental manipulations he was actually able to perform, the effects of destroying the visual cortex would be confounded with the effects, if any, of destroying other parts of the brain.   If, say,  Lashley’s experimental manipulation destroys both visual cortex and some portion of the auditory cortex, then it  is possible that  the diminished performance  is due to the destruction of auditory rather than visual cortex- i. e., that the experimental manipulation may not be an intervention on the visual cortex with respect to maze performance since it affects something else (auditory cortex) that may, for all that is known, affect maze performance independently of the damage to visual cortex.  Lashley seems to have reasoned that if he found diminished performance  under each of a number of different experimental manipulations which destroyed different parts of the brain in addition to the visual cortex, it was unlikely that  this total pattern of diminished  performance could be due to  just to the destruction of these additional brain areas, with the destruction of the visual cortex playing no role. From my point of view, what he was doing was using what happened under various  imperfect, fat handed experimental manipulations to triangulate on (act as a sort of surrogate for) what would have happened to maze performance in an ideal experiment in which only the visual cortex and nothing else was destroyed- i.e., in an experiment in which there is an immaculate intervention on visual cortex alone. Bogen himself says something very near to this in the passage that I quoted above about what an “ideal test” of the hypothesis under investigation would look like and I do not understand  why he is so resistant to this construal of Lashley’s procedure. Why, for example, is Lashley dissatisfied with the results of a single experiment which destroys both visual and auditory cortex unless it is because he thinks such an experiment fails to tell us what would happen in an ideal experiment in which there is an intervention that destroys visual cortex alone and that it is the latter not the former which is relevant to the causal claim that he wants to assess?
		So far 	I have been emphasizing the role of  the notion of an intervention  in elucidating what we are aiming at when we engage in causal inference in cases in which “immaculate” interventions are impossible. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, there is   another   point about fathanded or non-immaculate manipulations that deserves brief mention. This is that  even when a manipulation is fathanded, it may well be possible to predict  what will happen when it is performed by putting together information  from several interventionist counterfactuals. In other words, those of us who are attracted to  accounts of causation in terms of interventionist counterfactuals are not committed to the result that we can only predict what will happen under manipulations that qualify as immaculate interventions and can say nothing about what will happen under fathanded manipulations.  
As an illustration, consider a simplified version of an example drawn from Dan  Hausman (1998). A salt solution flows through pipes and mixing chambers. The concentration of salt in each chamber, measured by the variables X1. . .X4, depends on the upstream chambers to which it is connected, according to the following equations:
	( 3.1) X2 = aX1
	(3.2) X3 = bX1
	(3.3) X4 = cX2 + dX3
	Suppose first that the value of X2 is increased by one unit by means of an immaculate intervention, and consider the resulting change in the value of X4. Such an intervention sets the value of X2 to its new level in a way that is independent of other causes of X4 like X1 that affect X4 via a route that does not go through X2. In effect we imagine an additional exogenous causal arrow or pipeline directed into X2 (besides the X1  X2 pipe), with the change in level of X2 being due to this new route. If ( 3.1)-( 3.3) correctly represents the causal structure of this system, then under this intervention the level of X4 should increase by c units. Note that this nicely captures what one intuitively thinks of as the “effect” of a change in X2  on X4- this effect is just the change in X4 that would result from an intervention on X2.. By similar reasoning, the result of an intervention on X3  that  changes its value by one unit will change the value of X4 by  d units and the result of an intervention that changes X1 by one unit are changes in X2 and X3 by a and b units, respectively- i.e., all of the coefficients in the equations (3.1) – (3.3) have an interpretation in terms of what will happen under interventions.
Now suppose, by way of contrast, that X2  again increases by one unit, but this time the increase is the result of an increase in X1 by 1/a units. This  change will not count as an intervention on X2 with respect to X4, since X1 affects X4 via a route that does not go through X2.  Instead the change in X2 will involve a fat-handed, non –immaculate manipulation with respect to X4. The postulated increase in X1 will produce an increase of b/a units in X3 and this in turn will produce an additional change of (b/a)d units in X4, along the X1X3X4 route. The total change in X4 will now be the contribution that X2 makes to X4 plus the contribution that goes through X3 or c+(b/a)•d units. Thus knowing the structure of the system,  we can calculate what the overall change in X4 will be under a fathanded manipulation of X2 and we can do this from information about how its components X1, X2, X3 and X4 would change under immaculate interventions. We also see again, from a slightly different perspective, why we need the notion of an intervention. The causal effect on X4 of a one unit change in X2 is not the change in X4 that would result from a fat-handed manipulation of X2 like the one described above.   Instead, it is the change in X4 that would result from an intervention  on X2. 

4. Additional Criticisms and Responses
		I conclude with some brief responses regarding other issues and criticisms. 
		4.1) It might be claimed that the account I’ve offered captures aspects of how we test causal claims, it has nothing to do with the content of those claims. According to this objection, testing does often involve controls, comparisons with alternative situations etc. but this does not mean that the contents of causal claims have such comparisons built into them. Instead the content of such claims have to do only with what is actual.  My response: Why should evidence about controls etc., be relevant to causal  claims  unless it has something to do with the content of such claims? Put differently:  those who think that counterfactuals  play no role   in causal claims  need to provide an alternative account of the role of controls etc. in the testing of such claims. What is this alternative? 
		4.2) Objection: My discussion assumes determinism or at least the examples I discuss are all deterministic. For example, I talk about what would happen if a certain experimental manipulation were performed, rather than what the probability distribution of some variable would be if that manipulation were performed. But our best theories tell us that the world is indeterministic and this changes everything. 
		My response: To begin with, the only uncontroversial example we have of an empirically well confirmed theory that is irreducibly indeterministic is quantum mechanics. All or virtually all of our best theories in the biomedical and the social sciences are deterministic. This is true, in particular, in connection with so-called causal modeling techniques, which is the context in which statistical information is most likely to be extensively used: it is typically assumed, when these techniques are used, that the underlying models are deterministic, with the stochastic element being supplied by an unobserved error term whose contribution to what is observed is deterministic.   Moreover, as emphasized above,  whether or not deterministic theories are exactly true they often provide very  good approximations.   For these reasons, it seems to me a perfectly reasonable strategy to try to develop an account of causation that works for deterministic contexts. This is not  to deny that one should also develop an account that applies to indeterministic contexts. However, I insist, contra Bogen,  that  it is mistaken to suppose that the only background assumption that it is legitimate to make in discussing counterfactuals is   indeterminism. 
		4.3) Suppose, however, that we do assume, for whatever reason, that the domain for which we are formulating our account of causation is indeterministic and that we want an account of causation that fits with this fact. Suppose, in particular, that  our best background theory of this domain licenses counterfactuals like the following:
     (4.3.1 )  If X is set to value x by an intervention, then the probability that Y=y is p
where p is strictly between 0 and 1, 
but no stronger deterministic prediction about when Y=y  is possible. In these circumstances, my view is that the counterfactual
      (4.3..2)    If X is set to value x by an intervention, then   Y=y
is false.  Indeed,  unlike what I take to be Bogen’s position (or Lewis’), I think that (4.3.2) is   false under indeterminism even if both its antecedent and consequent turn out to be realized. However, I don’t see the falsity of (4.3.2)  as any bar to formulating a counterfactual theory of causation for indeterministic contexts. There are many forms such a theory might take: one of the simplest possibilities is:
X causes Y  iff there are distinct values of X,  x1  ≠x2 such that under an intervention      that sets X=x1,  the probability distribution of Y, Pr(Y) is different from the probability distribution of Y under an intervention that sets X=x2.
In other words, we provide an account of X causes Y in terms of counterfactuals of form (4.3.1) rather than in terms of counterfactuals of form (4.3.2). I don’t think that any of Bogen’s claims about counterfactuals of form (4.3.2) undermine the possibility of an analysis in terms of (4.3.1).
	4.4) Objection: The account  offered so far for Xs causing Y in terms of whether  there is some intervention on X alone that will change the value of Y works only for simple causal structures in which there is just one possible causal route from X to Y.  I haven’t explained how the account would work for more complex causal structures involving multiple routes and back-up causes.  Consider  a variant on a well-known example due to Hesslow (1976).    Birth control pills (B) directly cause   thrombosis (T) but also directly lower the probability of pregnancy (P) which is itself a direct  cause of thrombosis.  Suppose that the probability increase in T which is directly due to B is exactly balanced by the decrease in probability of T which occurs along the B --> P -->T route, so that the net change in the probability of thrombosis if one takes birth control pills is zero.  In this case there will be no   intervention on B  alone that will change the probability of T.  Nonetheless,  there is a  clear   sense in which B is a cause of T.
     
		Other  examples illustrating the same general point that counterfactual dependence is not necessary for causation in more complex structures will be familiar from  the philosophical literature: the back-up assassin who will shoot if and only if the primary assassin misses (or, if a scientifically realistic example is preferred, the gene which will produce a  protein product if and only if some other gene which produces the product is knocked out  and so on).
	Ways to handle such examples within a counterfactual framework have been explored in the recent literature by Pearl, by Pearl and Halpern, by my colleague Chris Hitchock, and in my forthcoming book. The basic strategy is to appeal to counterfactuals that involve combinations of interventions rather than a single intervention. I lack the space to describe how versions of this strategy  might be applied to all of the examples mentioned above, but let me illustrate it in connection with the birth control pills thrombosis example.  Here the idea is that   the causal relationship between B and T  would show itself in the fact that if we were to  fix the value of the pregnancy variable P by an intervention in a way that makes P independent of the value of B and then intervene to change the value of B, the value of P would change. We might simulate the  effects of such a combination of interventions by, for example, either (a) comparing the incidence of thrombosis among those who take birth control pills with those who do not in a population of women all of whom are infertile or who also employ other methods of contraception and hence cannot become pregnant or by (b) comparing the incidence of thrombosis among pregnant women who continue to take birth control pills with the incidence of thrombosis among pregnant women who do not take birth control pills. 
	4.5) Objection: The examples I describe mainly involve relatively coarse-grained input output relationships - drugs that are differentially associated with recovery and so on. Maybe it is natural to interpret these in terms of relationships of counterfactual dependence. But once intervening mechanisms are filled in – once we learn step-by-step, at a more detailed level,  how the drug works- an  appeal  to counterfactuals is no longer necessary. Two responses: First,  I certainly don’t dispute the importance of information about intervening mechanisms, but see this as  more information about additional, fine-grained patterns of counterfactual dependence, rather than as information that dispenses with counterfactuals in favor of something else. This  information about  more fine grained counterfactuals is sometimes carried  by language describing particular kinds of causal interaction – “attracts”, “repels”, “inhibits”,  “represses”, “induces”, “activates”  and so on- and sometimes by information about specific functional relationships,  expressed mathematically,  but  in both cases the counterfactual commitments are still there, even if they are less overt than in some of the cases described above.
	 Second, while, as I’ve just said, information about mechanisms is valuable, it is   important to keep in mind, as a number of the examples discussed above illustrate,  that causal relationships are often established in the absence of information about intervening mechanisms.  We don’t want an account of causation that is so closely tied to the exhibition of mechanisms that establishing  causal relationships always requires extensive information about intervening mechanisms. Fans of mechanisms owe us an account of what it is that we’ve established when we learn, e.g., that a drug cures some illness but don’t yet know about the mechanism by which it does so. Counterfactual accounts provide a straightforward answer to this question. 
	4.6) Objection: When I ask  how causal relevance, mechanism  etc. are to be characterized if not by reference to counterfactuals, I’m  asking for some completely general, ahistorical, contextless characterization of these notions.  Even if this could be supplied, which is dubious, it isn’t   needed.  Only  old -fashioned philosophers, with  a taste for illegitimate abstraction,   value such a thing.  Instead, it is enough to simply list  what are regarded by researchers in any given area as the “bottom out” activities   which  characterize the mechanisms in that area. Different subject matters will postulate different  sets of mechanisms and fundamental activities and these will change over time.
	Response:  Here is one very practical reason for wanting  something  more.  Jerry Fodor thinks that modus ponens is one of the mechanisms of cognition. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides think that humans have cheater detection mechanisms, mate selection mechanisms, and predator avoidance mechanisms, among many others. Randy Thornhill thinks that men (or at least some men) have a rape mechanism (or “module”), which when activated leads men to rape. On the other hand, your average neurobiologist doesn’t think that  any of these should  count as “mechanisms” at all.   How do we decide who is right? A mere list of what are regarded as fundamental mechanisms in evolutionary psychology and in neurobiology isn’t going to help, since these will recommend conflicting conclusions.  
	I suspect that  the response of Bogen  and Machamer will be that this is a straightforwardly empirical issue -   let’s see if  the evidence adduced by  evolutionary psychologists  supports their claims about cheater detection mechanisms and so on.    I think that this response misses an important part of what is at stake in  the assessment  of  mechanism talk in psychology.   As I see it, part of what is at issue in this assessment is  what a mechanism is in some  sense   that is not so closely tied to the claims of particular psychological theories.   Put slightly differently, what is  at issue has to do with  the  general, non-discipline specific commitments  that are built into the claim that something is a mechanism and furthermore the kind of mechanism that can ground causal explanations. Evolutionary psychologists are, to put it charitably, none to clear about what they mean when they talk about “mechanisms” and “modules” and their mechanisms lack many of the features (e.g. the “modularity” that Bogen regards as so preposterous) that one ordinarily thinks of a mechanism as possessing. Someone who is worried about these aspects of talk about mechanisms in evolutionary psychology is not going to be reassured by a list of the mechanisms that evolutionary psychologists regard as fundamental.
	Given a sufficiently thin,  non-committal notion of mechanism (meaning, roughly, whatever underlies differential task performance) evolutionary psychologists arguably do have evidence for the “mechanisms” they posit.  But, as I see it, the problem with  this notion of mechanism is that it is so attenuated and so shorn of  the commitments    one ordinarily takes to be built into the notion of a mechanism that (i) talk of a having discovered a cheater detection mechanism is highly misleading and (ii) more importantly,    cheater detection and other  mechanisms,  when understood only in this thin sense, cannot play the sort of causal explanatory role one wants and expects mechanisms to play. And while  I don’t have the space to try to argue for this position here, my hope/ expectation would be that one can bring all this out by exhibiting the failure of evolutionary psychology style mechanisms  and alleged causal explanations to respect the sorts of abstract  criteria I have defended in this paper and elsewhere: modularity, support for interventionist counterfactuals and so on.  
	Another example: Parsonian sociology. It strikes me as just a typology or  redescription of various kinds of behavior but Parsons and his followers, who for a while were very influential in sociology, certainly thought they were identifying “mechanisms’ of social change and stability.  Again the problem with this stuff is not (or not just) that it is empirically inaccurate- many facts about human behavior can be accurately described in Parsons’ framework- but rather that what it delivers aren’t really  causal mechanisms.
		To put the point slightly differently, I think that the danger of just providing a list of (what are currently regarded as) fundamental mechanisms and activities in different disciplines is that this doesn’t have much normative bite. It gives us no guidance when we are presented with a dispute that is not about (or not just about) the empirical facts but rather about whether what we are being presented with has the right general  features to count as mechanism at all, figure in causal explanations etc.. For that purpose we do need something more general and less discipline specific.   

5.	CONCLUSION
Although I’ve disagreed vigorously with Jim Bogen, I want to thank him for his role in organizing this workshop and his attention to my work. I applaud the focus of Machamer, Craver, Darden and others on mechanisms. This is an important and under -explored topic in philosophy of science.  However, I’m not persuaded  by the contention  one can elucidate claims about causes and mechanisms without appealing to counterfactuals. Nor do I understand why it is desirable to try to do this. It seems to me that  the mechanist program and programs that appeal to counterfactuals are complimentary, rather than in competition with each other.  Philosophers should welcome the use of any resources, including counterfactuals, that turn out to be useful in  elucidating the notion of a mechanism. 


   






^1	  If I’ve understood Bogen correctly, his motivation for this claim goes something like this: under determinism, it is “impossible” for anything to happen other than what actually happens – impossible because inconsistent with the laws and the actual initial conditions.  Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true. Hence under determinism any counterfactual with a contrary to fact antecedent is vacuously true. But  even if one agrees that counterfactuals  with impossible (in  some sense of impossible) antecedents are vacuously true, why on earth assume that the relevant sense of impossible is given by inconsistency with the laws and actual initial conditions? There is nothing that requires this assumption and most standard accounts of counterfactuals don’t make it, for the obvious reason that  it trivializes the use of counterfactuals under  determinism. Here is another notion of “impossible” that, although not problem-free, is far  more useful and appropriate: The antecedent of a counterfactual is impossible iff inconsistent with the laws alone and possible as long as it is consistent with some (not necessarily actual) initial conditions and the laws. As long as laws (or other causal generalizations) are stable under changes in initial conditions, as argued above, this will yield non-trivial truth values for counterfactuals under determinism.
^2	  Indeed we now have in Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000 and Pearl, 2000 a series of theorems specifying  when such undetermination exists and its extent.
